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Liberalisation, urban governance and gridlock: 
Diagnosing Yangon’s mobility crisis 
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Abstract:  
The city of Yangon is home to over 5 million people, hosts Myanmar’s largest port and produces 
a disproportionate share of national output. But a mobility crisis is undermining the city’s 
economic potential and contributing to a deteriorating quality of life for its residents. The most 
obvious symptom of this crisis is acute traffic congestion. The proximate causes are clear: 
growing demand for journeys, a surge in vehicle numbers, a modal shift away from buses, and 
myriad ‘flow disruptions’. However, solving this mobility crisis requires recognizing the 
underlying causes, including a ‘congestion incentive spiral’ fuelled by rapid liberalisation of 
vehicle imports in a context where there are few viable alternatives to buses and private 
automobiles. This situation is a direct consequence of systematic failures in urban planning, 
investment and regulation linked to active neglect from successive military regimes and 
dysfunctional institutional arrangements. To preserve its rich urban heritage, Yangon will need 
to embrace 21st century integrated planning practices that seek to maximise accessibility and 
mobility for all people rather than minimise traffic congestion for those who use cars.  
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The city of Yangon is experiencing a renaissance after decades of relative international isolation 
and political neglect under military rule (Morley 2013). Today the city is home to over 5 million 
people, hosts Myanmar’s largest port and is the commercial heart of the nation. In this new era 
characterised by political and economic liberalisation, Yangon has the potential to serve as an 
engine of economic growth. But the city’s potential to play this role is being undermined by a 
mobility crisis: as the economy speeds up, the city slows down. It has been estimated that average 
travel speeds at peak times plummeted from 38 km/h in 2007 to perhaps 10-12 km/h in mid-
2015 (ADB 2016). Yangon has been something of an outlier compared to other Southeast Asian 
cities, with relatively high usage of urban bus services and comparatively few private cars on the 
city’s roads. For example, as recently as 2013 it was estimated that there were only 25 passenger 
cars per 1,000 population on Yangon’s roads (JICA 2013). This number pales in comparison to 
other cities in the region, with an estimated 222 cars per 1000 in Jakarta and 363 per 1000 in 
Bangkok (Kutani 2013). However, rapid liberalisation is fuelling a dramatic shift away from buses 
as cars flood the city’s roads.   
 
Growing congestion is a significant constraint on both growth and poverty alleviation. Empirical 
research at the city and city-region level in other countries has shown that productivity suffers 
from congestion by raising the costs of doing business and generating friction in local labour 
markets (Cevero 2001; Weisbrod, Vary and Treyz 2003; Venables 2007). At the household level, 
congestion raises the costs of mobility thereby inhibiting access to livelihoods opportunities, 
diverting resources away from asset accumulation, and increasing exposure to harmful levels of 
pollutants that negatively impact upon health (World Bank 2002; Hein Ko Soe 2016). Sustainable, 
pro-poor urban development therefore depends upon the smooth functioning of a transport 
system that maximises mobility while minimising costs, particularly for the poorest and most 
vulnerable. 
 
In this paper we draw on a range of sources to analyse both the proximate and underlying causes 
of Yangon’s current congestion crisis. Our sources include key informant interviews, newspaper 
articles, international reports, government data, and original analysis of geospatial population 
data and satellite imagery.  
 
We argue that the current situation is better understood as a mobility crisis rather than a crisis 
of congestion per se. The proximate causes include growing demand for journeys, a surge in the 
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number of vehicles on the city’s roads in recent years, and a concomitant modal shift among 
commuters away from buses and towards private automobiles. But the underlying causes are 
more complex. The city has become stuck in a ‘congestion incentive spiral’ that ultimately stems 
from a governance crisis: the absence of metropolitan-scale governance institutions with the 
authority and capacity to deliver integrated transport solutions for the city. This is a consequence 
of partial institutional reforms under successive military regimes seeking to tame the city, 
ambiguities concerning the distribution of authority over city affairs introduced in the 2008 
constitution, and political interventions in city government operations. Although the current 
crisis has stimulated recent efforts to improve and coordinate transport management at the 
Region Government level, an historical dearth of coordinated land use planning and 
infrastructure investment will not be overcome quickly. Nevertheless, we argue that there are 
some relatively simple and cost-effective options for improving mobility in the city.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: section two provides a systematic analysis of the proximate 
causes of Yangon’s mobility crisis; section three considers the underlying causes linked to the 
broader political-institutional context and the incentives facing commuters; section four 
discusses various policy measures and reforms that might be considered to improve mobility; 
section five concludes. 
 
2. The proximate causes of Yangon’s mobility crisis 
2.1 Understanding mobility and congestion 
Yangon’s current mobility crisis is a direct result of traffic congestion, but it is important to 
recognize the difference between mobility and free-flowing streets. Mobility refers to the ease 
with which people and goods move through the urban landscape. While much of this movement 
happens on roads, in most cities walking, cycling and fixed-line transportation networks (e.g. 
trains, trams and BRTs) provide equally important means of getting around. It is therefore 
possible to significantly increase urban mobility without necessarily reducing traffic congestion 
by providing citizens and businesses with viable alternative modes of transport (UN-Habitat 
2013).  
 
However, although mobility and congestion are not intrinsically linked, Yangon’s residents rely 
heavily on motorised transport (i.e. buses, taxis and private automobiles). Worsening traffic 
congestion is therefore the most immediately apparent cause of the city’s current mobility crisis. 
To understand why traffic congestion has increased so dramatically it is useful to outline a 
theoretical framework for understanding the problem. 
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Traffic congestion is essentially a function of three factors: demand for road space, the supply of 
road space and ‘flow dynamics’. Demand is jointly determined by the number of journeys 
required to satisfy the mobility needs of a population and by modal choice. An increase in the 
number of people traveling by road due to population growth can create a situation whereby 
demand for road space exceeds supply at peak times, thereby causing gridlock. Similarly, a switch 
from public transport to individual automobile usage (i.e. modal shift) can also lead to excessive 
demand given that individualised automotive transport is less spatially efficient than public 
transit options such as busses: more road space is required to transport the same number of 
people by car than by bus. Recent research has highlighted the significance of modal choice by 
examining the effects of public transit strikes on congestion. The results indicate that the positive 
effect of public transport on reducing urban congestion has likely been underestimated in the 
past (see Anderson 2014).  
 
The most common response to growing demand for road space (and hence rising levels of 
congestion) is to increase the supply of road space. While intuitive, extensive research has shown 
that there is a ‘fundamental law of road congestion’ whereby expanding road supply generates 
more demand and hence further congestion (Duranton and Turner 2011; see also Arnott and 
Small 1994; Gakenheimer 1999; Gwilliam 2003). This is not to say that some expansion of 
capacity is not in order in rapidly growing cities such as Yangon, but simply generating more road 
space is unlikely to lead to significant increases in mobility. Indeed, there is now a consensus that 
improving mobility by encouraging and supporting alternative modes of transport is preferable 
to increasing the supply of road space (Buchanan & Gunn 2015; Mogridge 1997). 
 
The third factor that influences the degree of congestion is the way traffic flows. Even minor ‘flow 
disruptions’ can result in gridlock. For example, ‘irregularities in driver behaviour’ can trigger 
traffic jams as the erratic action of a single vehicle produces a ripple effect that brings a whole 
mass of automobiles to a temporary halt (see Orosz, Wilson & Stépán 2010). Bottlenecks—i.e. 
where road capacity is reduced through, for example, the merging of three lanes into one—
generate a similar effect (ibid). In such cases flow dynamics alone (rather than the balance 
between supply and demand) can be a source of congestion. 
 
2.2 Population growth and economic growth contribute to rising demand 
Although there is a dearth of reliable, time-series demographic and economic data for Yangon, we 
can infer substantial growth in raw demand for journeys in the city from a variety of sources.  
According to official census data, the population of Yangon Region (including both rural and 
urban areas) grew from 3.97 million in 1983 to 7.36 million in 2014 (Ministry of Immigration and 
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Population 2014). This represents a compound average annual growth rate of roughly 2%. 
Although this is not particularly rapid, it is substantially faster than the growth rate of the national 
population, which was roughly 1.2% over the same period. As a result, the Yangon Region’s share 
of the national population increased over this period from 11.2 percent in 1983 to 14.3 percent 
in 2014 (ibid).  
 
The 31-year gap in census data collection hinders analysis of recent trends, which are important 
given the notably abrupt increase in congestion in recent years. However, there are three other 
data sources that can be used to infer recent demographic and economic trends. The first is a 
population data set produced by the WorldPop.org project, which combines census data with 
other ancillary data (e.g. satellite imagery) to model population distribution for countries around 
the world. For Myanmar, gridded population data are available for 2010 and 2015. As Figure 1 
shows, analysis of these estimates indicates substantial population increase in all of Yangon’s 
Townships over this five-year period, with central Townships experiencing the most rapid 
demographic change (see Appendix A for details). 
 
Figure 1 | Population growth in Yangon, 2010-2015 
 
The second source of data that can be used to evaluate demographic and economic trends comes 
Landsat 7 ETM+ satellite imagery. High resolution images from 2003, 2013 and 2016 were 
processed to assess the extent, direction and rate of spatial expansion in the Yangon region over 
these years (see Appendix A). The results show that the built-up area of the city increased from 
roughly 24,000 km2 in 2003 to 64,500 km2 in 2016—an increase of 169 percent. Between 2013 
and 2016 alone the built-up area increased by 6.7 percent (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2 | Expansion of built-up areas in Yangon, 2003-2016 
 
The third data source also comes from satellite imagery; in this case nightlights data from the USA 
Defence Meteorological Satellite Program. Recent research has demonstrated that the amount of 
light radiating from a geographical region at night can be used to get a rough indication of 
economic activity in that region (Chen and Nordhaus 2011; Henderson, Storeygard and Weil 
2011; Henderson, Storeygard and Weil 2012). Figures 3 and 4 provide a graphic illustration of 
the change in the intensity and geography of luminosity (and hence economic activity) in Yangon 
Region between 2003 and 2013. Over this 10 year period the level of luminosity in greater Yangon 
nearly tripled. A rough estimate based upon the calculated elasticity of GDP with respect to 
luminosity indicates that this translates into an average annual growth rate in GDP of 8.5 percent. 
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Between 2008 (when the constitutional referendum was held) and 2013 the estimated annual 
growth rate is 11.2 percent (see Appendix B).  
Figure 3 | Luminosity in Yangon Region, 2003 
Figure 4 | Luminosity in Yangon Region, 2013 
 
Evidence of population growth, expansion of built-up areas and very substantial growth in 
nightlights collectively provide indirect evidence of increases in the raw demand for journeys in 
Greater Yangon. More people are spread over a wider area resulting in more commuters; and 
more economic activity can increase the demand for both passenger journeys and commercial 
vehicle activity (i.e. non-passenger journeys). However, demographic and economic changes 
alone cannot account for the speed with which congestion transformed from a minor nuisance to 
a matter of national concern.  
 
2.3 A flood of vehicles and a modal shift 
Growth in demand for journeys in recent years coincided with two important and interlinked 
trends: an abrupt expansion in the number of vehicles on Yangon’s roads and a modal shift among 
passengers away from buses and towards the use private cars.  
 
As Figure 5 illustrates, there has been an extremely rapid increase in the number of registered 
vehicles in the Yangon Region since 2011 when vehicle import restrictions were relaxed. Between 
2011 and 2014 there was a 153 percent increase in the total number of registered vehicles in 
Yangon, including a 93 percent increase in passenger vehicles (i.e. cars and vans) and 507 percent 
increase in light trucks. Perhaps most surprisingly, given that there is a strict ban on civilian use 
of motorcycles in Yangon, there was a 263 percent increase in registered “two wheel” vehicles 
over this period, from roughly 56,000 to over 200,000.  
 
Figure 5 | Change in number of registered vehicles (bars) & bus passengers (line) 
 
This explosive growth in the number of passenger vehicles and motorcycles on Yangon’s roads 
has coincided with a steep decline in the number of people using the bus system, even as the 
population has grown (see Figure 5). These two trends reflect a dramatic modal shift: more and 
more people are choosing to use private automobiles rather than buses, which significantly 
increases demand for road space even in the absence of increases in the number of road users.  
 
2.4 Flow disruptions 
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Navigating smoothly through Yangon’s increasingly congested streets is further complicated by 
myriad obstacles and bottlenecks that exacerbate the problem. One of the most often heard 
complaints has been the erratic behaviour of bus drivers, who weave in and out of traffic and 
make abrupt and un-signalled stops that lead to temporary jams and bottlenecks (Frontier 
Myanmar 2017). Due to the age, generally poor maintenance and constant abuse of these busses 
(e.g. overcrowding) breakdowns are common, leading to further bottlenecks. 
 
Taxis are often cited as a serious problem. Idle taxis parked illegally take up road space while 
active taxis drive aggressively, make abrupt stops to pick up passengers and linger while 
negotiating prices, which are not regulated in any way (Ei Thandar Tun 2015). Efforts to improve 
the situation through metering have failed in the past (Nay Linn Aung 2011). 
 
In the central business district of Yangon, a lack of adequate parking is also perceived as major 
sources of bottlenecks (Noe Noe Aung 2013; Aye Nyein Win 2018). There are very few dedicated 
off-street parking facilities leading drivers to cruise for precious street parking, which itself can 
cause congestion (Shoup 2006). This is compounded in some areas by the use of potential parking 
spaces by street vendors, who are an integral part of the downtown economy (Myo Satt 2016). 
However, multiple past attempts to reduce congestion by forcibly moving street vendors have 
done little to improve flow throughout the central business district. Other efforts to address the 
perceived deficiency in parking spaces downtown include expanding roads to create new spaces 
(Noe Noe Aung 2013), requiring new condominium developments to offer 1.2 parking spaces per 
unit (Kang Wan Chern 2018; Chau 2017), and introducing a policy requiring individuals seeking 
to import a vehicle to prove that they have a parking space to use (Aye Nyein Win 2015c). As 
discussed below, all of these policies have had perverse effects and have failed to make any 
discernible impact on congestion. 
 
Finally, an issue that was raised by many formal and casual informants was the problem of the 
daily school run. There are no official school busses in Yangon, which has a large youth population 
traveling to and from school every day—sometimes very long distances. In the absence of a 
centrally organized system a private, ad hoc system has emerged comprising a fleet of perhaps 
25,000 minibus shuttles, taxis and personal cars, which are all used to ferry children around, often 
at peak times (May Thinzar Naing 2016). Clusters of double- and triple-parked vehicles outside 
schools at the beginning and end of the day create bottlenecks in some areas, while the sheer 
number of vehicles involved in this daily migration adds significantly to the mass of vehicles on 
the roads at busy times. In recognition of this issue the Yangon Region Government purchased 
200 school buses with the hope of improving the situation, but fears of driver safety and poor 
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management had delayed the government’s roll with a newly proposed launch date of June 2018 
(Lu Maw Naing 2017; Ei Thandar Tun 2018) 
 
There is one potential source of flow disruption that is largely absent, at least in central Yangon. 
Unlike cities such as Jakarta, where mobs of motorcycles weave in and out of traffic, contributing 
to total vehicle mass and the stop-start behaviour that creates ripples of congestion, there are 
virtually no motorcycles on the roads in Yangon due to a ban imposed in 2003 (Goldberg 2015).  
 
2.5 A perfect storm for gridlock 
The combination of a growing population, increased economic activity, a flood of vehicles and a 
modal shift away from public transportation options has created a perfect storm of congestion in 
Yangon; one that is compounded by a lack of alternative modes of transport to support urban 
mobility. 
 
Until very recently little had been done to address Yangon’s growing transport needs, apart from 
the lightly regulated network of private buses that emerged to meet demand (discussed below).  
The only noticeable infrastructure investment in recent years has been the construction of seven 
flyovers that do not correspond to broader transport plan and have had a negligible impact on 
congestion (Thu Zar 2016). The only alternatives to cars and busses are a limited and poorly 
maintained circular rail line (built during the colonial era) and walking. Bicycles and trishaws 
have been banned from the CBD and virtually all main roads since 2003 (Long 2013). 
 
While identifying these proximate causes is a useful and necessary first step in the search for 
plausible solutions, it is necessary to dig one layer deeper to understand why these conditions 
exist. The growth of Yangon’s population and economy are unquestionably positive 
developments for the city and therefore undesirable targets for public intervention. This 
therefore leaves us with the following questions: Why has there been a surge of vehicles and what 
(if anything) should be done about it? Why have citizens been abandoning busses en masse and 
what can be done to reverse the trend? Why are the city’s buses and taxis so ill-behaved and why 
are traffic laws more rigorously enforced? And why has Yangon, an emerging megacity, failed to 
invest in a mass urban transit system? 
 
3. The political economy of gridlock 
3.1 Congestion as a consequence of economic liberalization 
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The boom in private car use on Yangon’s roads is a direct function of the broader process of 
accelerated economic liberalization that has accompanied Myanmar’s political transition. Before 
2011 the importation of automobiles was controlled by the military, with all imports going 
through either a military or government company channel. Non-affiliated auto traders would pay 
a premium to import vehicles and then turn and make a profit by reselling the car at a higher cost. 
Each time a car was sold a member in the chain could profit between 6,000 and 10,000 USD, which 
could bring the cost of a Toyota Land Cruiser to nearly $500,000 USD by the end of a cycle (Kuhn 
2012). The high price of imports kept the supply of automobiles highly restricted before 2011; 
most of the vehicles on the roads of Myanmar were built decades earlier, some dating as far back 
as WWII (ibid). 
 
The slow shift away from a state-socialism towards a state-mediated capitalist model began in 
1988 following the failure of the Burmese Socialist Programme Party’s autarkic economic 
management over the previous two decades (Jones 2014). By the turn of the millennium the 
number of private firms had overtaken the number of state enterprises, but the state maintained 
a commanding role, in part by restricting trade and using foreign exchange and import licenses 
as tools of political patronage (ibid). The failure of the state (i.e. military) to respond effectively 
to the devastation wrought by Cyclone Nargis in 2008 revealed the extent to which the balance 
of power had shifted towards crony capitalists, who mobilized resources (including the business-
financed NGO Myanmar Egress) to deliver aid and lead reconstruction efforts (ibid). The 
subsequent reforms to currency management and import controls—including on vehicles—can 
therefore be understood as part Myanmar’s broader political-economic transition from state 
socialism to nominally democratic crony capitalism. 
 
It hasn’t been a smooth process. The first step in liberalizing auto imports was known locally as 
the ‘cars for clunkers’ program. This was intended to remove older cars from the road and replace 
them with more modern, but still second-hand, vehicles, mostly from Japan. Under the program, 
any car between 20 and 40 years old could be traded in by the owner in return for a license to 
import a newer vehicle built no earlier than 1995 (Aung Hla Tun 2011). The trade was not cheap 
and required handover of the previously owned car along with payment of the new car’s sale cost, 
customs duty, registration fee and surcharge amounting to an additional 165 percent mark-up 
above the purchase price (Kuhn 2012). Nevertheless, in under a year, 60,000 cars were traded in 
for import licenses with a total of 70,000 cars imported by the programmes end (Smyth 2014). 
This approach had some perverse consequences. First, a new class of brokers emerged who 
would purchase old cars at inflated prices from owners who were unable to afford the costs of a 
newly imported car. These brokers would then trade in the newly acquired used vehicle for an 
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import license, import a new car, and sell it at a profit (Aye Nyein Win 2015). Second, Myanmar-
based car manufacturers began piecing together vehicles from old parts to sell to individuals keen 
to acquire import licenses (Htoo Thant 2015). In other words, many of the vehicles that were 
traded in for import licenses had not in fact been operating on city roads at all. The result was 
substantial increase in the number of vehicles on Yangon’s roads.  
 
By 2012, anyone with a national identity card could import one car and businesses could import 
up to 50 vehicles per license (Aye Nyein Win 2015; Aye Nyein Win 2015b). Those who could not 
afford a car could (and did) sell their license to brokers who would open registered or 
unregistered dealerships on the streets of Yangon (Aye Nyein Win 2015b). This drove a further 
surge in vehicle numbers on Yangon’s roads (see Figure 5). The two government companies 
which had previously monopolized the import market now had to compete with 172 newly 
licensed private dealers and 14 international manufacture dealerships which had opened by 
2014 (Myanmar Times 2014). At its peak Myanmar was importing 20,000 cars a month (Aye 
Nyein Win 2015). Regular policy changes over the next three years led to such rapid reductions 
in the retail price of cars that newly imported vehicles were sometimes left at the port because 
the taxes owed were higher than the potential resale value of the vehicle (Aye Nyein Win 2014).   
 
The flood of new cars on Yangon’s roads was, in short, a direct consequence of plummeting prices 
associated with Myanmar’s broader trajectory of liberalization. This process has created a 
constellation of new stakeholders invested in the auto import business, and a large new class of 
commuters on Yangon’s roads.§  
 
3.2 Perverse incentives in a competitive bus cartel 
With automobile prices plummeting, the rapid modal shift away from buses noted above is easily 
understood. Due to an array of perverse incentives built into the system, buses became notorious 
for long waits, overcrowding, price-gouging, rude staff and reckless driving (ADB 2016; JICA 
2014; Tin Htet Paing 2016; Sithu Aung Myint 2017). With growing numbers of people opting for 
cars, these issues were compounded by longer and longer journeys. Most of the problems 
associated with the buses were a natural by-product of the incentives built into the system, which 
operated as a ‘competitive cartel’ in which thousands of bus owners joined an essentially 
independent organization that regulated entry but permitted competition on most routes.  
                                                 
§ Why import liberalization was pursued in 2011 is an interesting and unanswered question. It is worth 
noting that this policy came on the heels of the disputed 2010 election in which the military-backed party 
claimed a contentious victory and just before the 2012 parliamentary by-election, in which the opposition 
leader Aung San Suu Kyi was allowed to participate after her release from house arrest. 
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This system emerged organically after 1974 with the growth of private sector bus operators who 
were allowed to operate under the supervision of the Motor Transport Management Committee. 
In 2009 this became the Yangon Region Central Supervisory Committee for Motor Vehicles and 
Vessels, more commonly referred to as Ma Hta Tha (JICA 2014; JICA 2013). Although nominally 
under the control of the Yangon Region government, Ma Hta Tha appears to have operated largely 
independently, overseeing a range of bus operators. These included two large private companies: 
the military-owned Parami Bus Line (operating as Bandoola Transport Co. Ltd) and Myanmar 
Golden City Link (Tin Htet Paing 2016b). However, these firms accounted for a small fraction of 
the thousands of buses on Yangon’s roads, the remainder of which were owned by small 
operators who were members of sub-organizations known as Bus Supervisory Committees 
(BSCs) and Bus Line Committees (BLCs). The role of Ma Hta Tha and the BSCs and BLCs were to 
regulate entry into the system and to regulate the behaviour of operators.  
 
The result was something resembling a cartel, with restricted entry, but limited competition on 
routes was permitted and most drivers and conductors were paid on commission to incentivize 
revenue maximization. The result was competition for passengers among small numbers of 
operators, which led to dangerous driving, overcrowding on buses and price-gouging by the 
conductors responsible for collecting fares and managing passengers on board. In this cash-based 
system there were incentives all the way up the chain from the conductors to the regulatory 
organizations to under-report passenger numbers and the fares collected to capture marginal 
rents (Htun et al. 2012; Gwilliam 2003). At the same time, competition kept margins low, which 
encouraged owners to spend little on vehicle maintenance, which in turn led to deterioration of 
buses and frequent breakdowns (Htun et al. 2012). Without independent enforcement of 
standards and traffic laws, the buses became an inescapable nuisance for riders and other road 
users alike. Similar consequences of deregulated urban transport systems have been seen in other 
cities in low and middle-income countries (see Rizzo 2002; Goodfellow 2012). 
 
The persistence of this arrangement is likely due to the lucrative nature and dispersed interests 
involved. If official statistics are to be believed, the system was carrying an average of 2.5 million 
passengers a day at its peak in 2007. If we estimate a (minimum) average daily fare of 100 MMK 
(given that the cheapest one-way ride would have been 50 MMK) this represents an annual 
turnover worth 90 billion MMK—or roughly USD 71 million at the estimated real exchange rate 
in 2007 of 1296 MMK/1 USD (Kato et al. 2008; Kubo 2007). This revenue was being distributed 
among—and therefore supporting the livelihoods of—thousands of owners, drivers, conductors 
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and employees of the BSCs, BLCs, Ma Hta Tha and the traffic police who were paid to look the 
other way (Hein Ko Soe 2017).  
 
With such a broad base of vested interests, improving the system has proven challenging. 
However, as discussed below, the depth of the mobility crisis coupled with determined leadership 
at the Region government level has resulted in recent reform.  
 
3.3 The congestion incentive spiral 
With the price of automobiles plummeting and the de facto costs of using the bus system rising 
(in terms of fares, time and comfort), the stage was set for an unusually rapid modal shift in 
Yangon. Moreover, this shift is self-reinforcing and creates a classic ‘tragedy of the commons’ 
scenario—or a ‘congestion incentive spiral’.  
 
As congestion worsens, bus users suffer more than car users because they must sit through 
periodic stops and rarely disembark at their final destination. By contrast, car users can go 
directly from origin to destination without stops. In other words, it is nearly always faster to use 
a car than a bus sharing the same road. This simple fact incentivizes those individuals who have 
the means to do so to abandon the buses. But in so doing they contribute to worsening congestion, 
which creates increasingly strong incentives to abandon the buses. This self-reinforcing cycle 
harms both the car users and the bus users, but it is a natural consequence of the fact that the 
social costs of increased car usage exceed the private costs (Gakenheimer 1999).  
 
The situation can be made even worse in the long run by what is known as the Downs-Thomson 
paradox (Arnott and Small 1994). Simply put, if rising congestion is met with expanded road 
capacity, this could worsen congestion by undermining incentives to use public transport. The 
more attractive alternatives become, the less people opt for the public option. This reduces 
revenue, which in turn incentivizes reduced public services, which in turn makes public transport 
increasingly less attractive to commuters. 
 
The seismic shift in the cost-benefit analysis of individual commuters that began with the 
liberalization of automobile imports now has a self-reinforcing logic that could make the situation 
far worse without public intervention designed to realign individual incentives with the public 
good.  
 
3.4 A crisis of metropolitan governance 
13 
Coherent, coordinated intervention to tackle the current crisis is unlikely in the short to medium 
term due to the confused distribution of authority over planning and regulation in Yangon. The 
current institutional mosaic is a consequence of partial institutional reforms over successive 
regimes determined to tame the city rather than promote its development.  
 
The origins of Yangon’s governance arrangements can be traced back to the colonial era when 
the British established a partially elected municipal body with decision making authority 
legislated under the Municipal Act of 1898 (Furnivall 1961). The Municipal Act of 1922 went one 
step further by giving the Municipal Committee of Rangoon (Yangon) the power to elect one of 
their own members to serve as President (Act III of 1934 changed this title to Mayor), with a clear 
description of duties and power over four standing committees including Finance; Roads and 
Building; Water and Sewage; Public Health and Markets and the Education Board (Pearn 1939). 
Additionally, this bill gave the Committee the power to collect tax in order to fund the execution 
of those duties (ibid). During this period investments were made in a circular rail line, a 
downtown tram network and bus services. 
 
After gaining independence in 1948, municipal institutions were reformed to ensure greater 
democratic representation. Elections to the municipal council were held every three years, and 
unlike their British predecessors who held elections using race-based constituencies, the new 
government determined voting by geographical ward. However, the nature of governance in the 
city changed dramatically under two successive military regimes. 
 
Following a military coup in 1962, Rangoon came under the full control of what was to become 
the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP). Under the military-led caretaker government (the 
predecessor to the BSPP) all members of the municipal committee were dismissed while new 
BSPP military leadership filled the positions. In 1974 the BSPP enshrined its legitimacy as the sole 
political party and administrative authority at all levels of government in a new constitution. 
 
While the British had prioritized building infrastructure in the central business district, and the 
post-independence government had focused on establishing new Buddhist monuments, the 
military caretaker government prioritized cleaning up the city and promoting “discipline” among 
the residents (Seekins 2014). One of the first acts of the new government was to tear down 
informal settlements in the colonial core and relocate the population to new suburbs on the 
outside of the city (ibid). Infrastructure was to be provided in these new settlements, such as 
piped water, roads, electricity, bridges, schools and clinics. However, in practice these services 
were lacking, and without proper access to public transportation the newly relocated residents 
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were effectively cut off from their previous lives downtown (ibid). With the exception of the initial 
development of new suburbs, which exacerbated transport challenges for residents, the 
economically stagnant BSPP invested little in the further development of Rangoon’s transport 
infrastructure (Seekins 2014). 
 
The centralised system of administration and generally laissez-faire approach to urban 
management in Rangoon persisted until the 1988 protests and corresponding security 
crackdown that effectively ended the rule of the BSPP. The military-led State Law and Order 
Restoration Council (SLORC) that took over kept the administrative organization of the previous 
government but renamed the city Yangon and amended the previous Rangoon Municipal Law 
with the Yangon City Development Law. This law put the new Yangon City Development 
Committee (YCDC) under the direct control of SLORC and reduced the functions and 
responsibility of the committee (UNDP 2015). By instituting a new governance structure without 
repealing the previous 1922 municipal law, the new directive reduced the mandate but did not 
address how tasks were to be managed by the new centrally controlled administration (ibid).  
 
As with the BSPP, the priority for the SLORC administration was the establishment of new towns 
to manage the “problem” of informal settlements and those who posed a threat to state security. 
The 1988 protests had revealed the extent to which Rangoon could serve as a flashpoint for 
resistance to military rule and so the regime sought to reduce the population in the centre, 
cultivate religious nationalism through investments in new Buddhist monuments, and close the 
university campuses that were associated with 1988 activists (Seekins 2005). Over half a million 
residents were relocated from downtown to Yangon’s new periphery (Seekins 2014), 
contributing to a near doubling of the physical extent of the city by the end of the century (Morley 
2013).  
 
The new towns were geographically isolated from the central nodes of commerce and there were 
no significant investments in transport infrastructure to ensure efficient mobility throughout the 
expanded city. Additionally, a motorcycle ban in 2003 took away or criminalized an essential 
mode of travel for the city’s residents (Board 2017). Morley (2014) argues that the economic 
hardships these new towns were intended to prevent simply transplanted the hardships from the 
downtown to the periphery. The relative neglect of Yangon during this period was accompanied 
by massive investment in the creation of a brand-new capital city, Naypyidaw, located 300km 
north of Yangon. In 2005 the seat of political and administrative power was officially transferred 
from Yangon to Naypyidaw.   
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A new constitution was ratified in 2008 that established a new structure of administration for the 
states and regions (no longer called divisions). In the former capital, this entailed the creation of 
a new Yangon Regional Government (YRG) and provided for some share of responsibility over 
key planning and regulatory functions between the national and sub national levels of 
administration (Nixon et al. 2013).  
 
Beginning in 2012 the Yangon Region Government and YCDC collaborated with the Japan 
International Cooperation Agency to ‘develop a strategic urban development plan’ for greater 
Yangon. Shortly after, The Yangon Heritage Trust (YHT), a local organization founded by 
members of the Association of Myanmar Architects, produced the Yangon Heritage Strategy for 
integrated holistic planning around the historic colonial core. Published in 2014 and 2016 
respectively, these documents provided a detailed vision for transport development in the region 
and in the city. However, apart from a handful of token projects, these plans have essentially been 
ignored.  
 
Meanwhile, the 2013 Yangon City Municipal Law – in accordance with Schedule II of the 2008 
constitution - placed both the budget and administrative oversight of the YCDC under the control 
of the newly established regional government (UNDP 2015). Just as the 1990 law served to 
supplement the 1922 municipal law, the 2013 law is effectively an amendment which provides 
some clarity of responsibility but does not directly address the existing legislation (Hein Ko Soe 
2017), thereby adding to legal ambiguities around authority over city affairs.  
 
The law established a nine-member committee with four members appointed by the regional 
government, four elected members from each of the city’s four districts and a mayor who is 
appointed by the Chief Minister of the Regional Government. The mayor then has two positions, 
one as the head of the YCDC and one as the Region Minister for Development Affairs and is 
accountable to the Chief Minister and the Regional Parliament (UNDP 2015). A city-wide election 
was held in 2014 once the bi-laws were established with hundreds of candidates vying for the 
four central committee positions along with 12 district level and 99 township level positions 
(Hein Ko Soe 2017). While it was the first municipal election in decades, the process was highly 
contested with only 25 percent of the 400,000 eligible voters turning out to vote (ibid).    
 
Today, the YCDC is nominally responsible for planning, infrastructure development and 
maintenance, water and sanitation, solid waste management, management of public spaces and 
associated amenities, and public health in the city. It also has legal authority to tax and spend and 
is financially self-sufficient (UNDP 2015). In practice, however, YCDC has become paralysed and 
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disempowered, often coming into conflict with the Region Government and national ministries, 
which also have legal authority in many areas from land use planning to housing to infrastructure 
and transport. While YCDC has some responsibilities for roads and bridges within its area, so too 
does the Region-level Ministry of Transport, as well as several national ministries including the 
Ministries of Construction, Home Affairs and Transport and Communications (ADB 2016).  
 
This institutional mosaic has proven dysfunctional and has undermined efficient and sustainable 
management of urban development in Yangon (ADB 2016; JICA 2014). For example, the regional 
parliament initiated a USD $24 million project to build two flyovers that was not related to any 
structural plan and was ultimately halted despite being approved by the previous government 
(Eleven Myanmar 2016). In the construction sector, multiple governing bodies have authority to 
grant building permits, which has contributed to uncoordinated land development and often 
project delays. Indeed, construction companies have expressed frustration with the current 
mosaic of six different authorities that may need to grant permission to build, resulting in a 
process that can take between two and three years (Htun Kaing 2016). Companies essentially 
find themselves essentially shopping for permission: if the YCDC declines approval for a project 
the Region Government may overrule the YCDC (ibid). This lack of coherent authority structures 
in Yangon is ultimately a consequence of the way responsibility over key urban management 
functions evolved through successive regimes and were articulated in the Constitution (Section 
96 and Schedule 2), as well as the various overlapping legal structures that empower the YCDC 
(see UNDP 2015).  
 
To complicate matters further, political contestation and allegations of rampant corruption have 
resulted in a crisis of legitimacy at the city government level. Following the victory of the National 
League for Democracy in 2015, the 115 elected members of the YCDC were dismissed from their 
positions on the pretence that a fresh election should be held under the new political 
dispensation. To date this municipal election has still not occurred, with the city run by four 
committee leaders and the mayor, all appointed by the Region government (UNDP 2015). A new 
law set to replace the 1922 law is currently under review, but postponements and a lack of 
transparency have driven some MPs to voice concerns that the government is effectively 
operating illegally (Hein Koe Soe 2017).  
 
In sum, Yangon was seen as a political liability under successive military regimes in the 
independence era. As a result, both the BSPP and SLORC sought to disempower the city 
government, assert direct control and disperse populations away from the core of the city. The 
resulting sprawl combined with a dearth of investment in new transport infrastructure and 
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services has contributed significantly to the current crises. Moreover, the institutional legacy of 
efforts to tame Yangon is a mosaic of overlapping authority structures vulnerable to political 
manipulation and devoid of popular accountability. As a result, Yangon does not have a robust 
institutional foundation for coordinating land use planning and transport development. This is a 
classic example of the ‘fundamental paradox of urban transport’—a situation in which demand 
for mobility is not met with concomitant supply due to coordination failures across those 
responsible for transport infrastructure, service delivery and financing (Gwilliam 2003).  
 
 
4. Improving mobility and taming congestion 
4.1 Prioritising mobility over congestion relief  
Barring an unforeseen crisis, Yangon will continue to grow over the next decade and journey 
demand will continue to rise and exert further pressure on the urban transport system. While 
some of this demand might be met through an improved and expanded bus service, the 
congestion-incentive spiral that is driving growth in private automobile use will not be broken 
without more radical interventions.  
 
When considering solutions, it is helpful to frame the problem as one of mobility rather than 
traffic. Prioritising mobility encourages a shift away from focusing on congestion relief towards 
increasing the average speed that people move through the city. This in turn highlights the 
importance of enhancing alternatives to cars, including walking, cycling, motorcycles, buses and 
fixed-line networks insulated from traffic such as rail and bus rapid transit.  
 
4.2 Supporting alternative modes: walking, cycling and motorcycles 
There has been very little discussion—at least publicly—of promoting alternative modes of 
transport, including walking, cycling and motorcycles. Yet these could play an important 
complimentary role in boosting urban mobility. According to a survey conducted in 2012 over 40 
percent of all journeys in Yangon are on foot (JICA 2013). Provision for pedestrians varies widely 
across the city and could be substantially improved in many areas with modest investment. This 
could be particularly helpful in the city centre and around key transport hubs in greater Yangon.  
 
Promoting bicycle usage could have an even more wide-ranging positive impact on mobility in 
the city. Bicycles are a highly efficient, sustainable and healthy mode of transport (UN Habitat 
2013), and Yangon’s relatively flat topography is very cycle-friendly. Reducing or eliminating 
restrictions on the use of bicycles in the city centre, as well as along some arterial routes, could 
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rapidly increase individual mobility without exacerbating air pollution. It would also be a 
comparatively affordable option for many of Yangon’s lower-income residents and an attractive 
one—particularly if investments were made in developing some cycling infrastructure such as 
dedicated lanes on the busiest roads. Embracing a city-wide cycling plan would place Yangon 
among the world’s leading cities in terms of promoting sustainable urban mobility. However, 
while permitting bicycles would boost urban mobility, it is unlikely to reduce congestion.  
 
The same is likely true of permitting motorcycles in the city. Lifting current restrictions would 
almost certainly increase mobility without reducing traffic. In the short to medium run 
motorization rates would increase as new people who can afford a motorcycle but not a car take 
up this option. But it is highly unlikely that existing car owners would choose to invest in a new 
vehicle and switch having already invested in a car. Indeed, the evidence suggests that motorcycle 
usage is an intermediate step in motorization, with users eventually upgrading to automobiles 
(Gwilliam 2003). Moreover, allowing motorcycles might encourage some people to abandon the 
bus system, thereby stimulating the Downs-Thomson Paradox noted above and potentially 
undermining the financial viability of the bus system (ibid). Finally, motorcycles would likely lead 
to higher injury and fatality rates on the roads and could significantly increase flow disruptions 
(ibid). In sum, there is simply not enough research to make an informed cost-benefit analysis of 
the current motorcycle policy or the potential impacts of reform.  
 
4.3 Reforming the bus system and reviving Bus Rapid Transit plans 
In January 2017, the Yangon Region government pushed through a dramatic reform of the bus 
system by taking over Ma Hta Ta, forcing a consolidation of ownership in the sector and 
introducing a new route structure. Compensation has also been reformed: all drivers and 
conductors now receive fixed salaries rather than commissions to eliminate incentives for 
overcrowding and reckless driving. Although the change was abrupt and perhaps premature, 
resulting in a shortage of buses on the roads and frustrating both bus owners and passengers, it 
was not an unmitigated disaster. Moreover, the new hybrid system of public control combined 
with private operators in the Yangon Bus Service (YBS) resolves many of the market failures 
inherent in the previous competitive-cartel system and is more aligned with best practice in the 
sector (Estache and Gomez-Lobo 2005). It also represents a bold test of the government’s ability 
to tackle intense vested interests established in the previous era of military rule, with the 
outcome likely to be interpreted as an indicator of the extent of substantive political change in 
Myanmar (Frontier Myanmar 2017).  
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While initial reactions were mixed at best with many referring to the bus line as pyithu seit pyet 
YBS, or the “people’s disappointment” in many respects the rollout of the YBS has already been a 
partial success. One year after the roll out the Yangon Regional Transport Authority (YRTA) 
secretary Dr. Maung Aung told a local newspaper that the YBS project had been “70 percent 
successful” (Hein Ko Soe 2018). Against the odds the Region government has forced a 
restructuring of ownership and management of the sector despite the many vested interests 
involved. This may have been facilitated by securing buy-in from some key stakeholders, 
including Bandoola Transportation Co, Ltd (owned by the military); Golden City Transportation 
Company (with 500 buses purchased by crony-owned Ayeyarwaday Bank); Omni Focus Co, Ltd 
(run by the grandson of former military leader Ne Win); and the Yangon Bus Public Co, Ltd, which 
is a public-private partnership originally established to run the Bus Rapid Transit system. Several 
other companies—including several recently created by conglomerates of small scale bus 
owners—have bought in to the system, including Yangon Urban Public Transportation Co, Ltd; 
Power Eleven Public Co, Ltd; Sanwalela and San Raung Ni Co, Ltd; City Linter Bus Public Co, Ltd; 
Golden Southern District Co, Ltd. 
 
Some bus owners have resisted the reform and refused to put their buses on the road under the 
direction and regulation of the new YBS authority (Hein Ko Soe 2017). During the initial rollout 
this meant that there was a short-run capacity deficit, and even after two contentious deals 
brought 2,000 new buses to the roads, the deficit has been reduced but the system has nearly 
1000 fewer vehicles than it did in the previous system (Slodowski, Wa Lone and Lee 2017; Hein 
Ko Soe 2018). Expansion of capacity among those who have joined the scheme should make up 
for current deficits and yield a system with more transparent fares, safer driving and improved 
behaviour on the part of conductors. However, this reform is unlikely to significantly reduce 
congestion in the medium to long term given rising demand for journeys and the precipitous 
modal shift in recent years. 
 
A very promising alternative was announced in 2015 in the form of a Bus Rapid Transit plan, with 
new buses set to ply key arterial routes. Although new buses did indeed hit Yangon’s roads early 
in 2016 with BRT logos they did not benefit from dedicated lanes, which is the defining 
characteristic of a BRT system. Consequently, they were subject to the same traffic conditions as 
all other vehicles and made no obvious impact on commuter behaviour. The BRT plans appear to 




One of the only things that might arrest the ‘uncontrolled haemorrhage’ (ADB 2016, pg. 7) of 
passengers from the bus system will be an alternative to driving that is faster, reasonably priced 
and relatively comfortable. This in turn requires a fixed line network that is fully insulated from 
city traffic—particularly at peak times—and a BRT system would be the most rational option 
under the circumstances. 
 
The economic argument for such a system is strong: estimates suggest that constructing a BRT 
network would be far cheaper than the currently proposed alternatives. A BRT plan proposed by 
the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) has an estimated price tag of 5 million USD 
per km. By contrast, the cost per km for modernizing the existing circular rail line is estimated at 
$20 million per km (ADB 2016). Other proposed options are similarly expensive, with per km 
prices of $10-25 million for a tram, $15-40 million for light rail system, $35-40 million for a 
monorail, $50-100 million for an above ground mass rapid transit system and between $130 
million and $162 million for an underground MRT system (JICA 2014). 
 
The sooner such a system is implemented the better given the strong ‘path dependency’ in 
commuter habits. In other words, once people shift towards using automobiles to get around the 
harder it will be to lure them back into using public transport options such as the bus system.  
 
4.4 Restructuring incentives and raising revenue 
Rather than lure people out of cars with a faster alternative (such as a BRT), policymakers could 
try to incentivise commuters to consider alternatives by influencing the personal costs of each 
option. Three mechanisms that have proven effective in reducing private automobile use in other 
contexts are petrol taxes, parking policies and congestion pricing. Each have the collateral benefit 
of generating revenues that can be re-invested in upgrading and maintaining transport 
infrastructure.  
 
Myanmar has the second lowest petrol prices of any Southeast Asian country after Malaysia 
(Globalpetrolprices.com). Low prices reduce incentives to use public transport and represent a 
forgone revenue opportunity: many countries use petrol tax as a means of financing transport 
related infrastructure investments.  However, increasing taxes on fuel is politically challenging 
everywhere, and particularly in Myanmar.  The 2007 ‘Saffron Revolution’ began following an 
overnight doubling of petrol prices and five-fold increase in natural gas prices (BBC 2007). More 
recently there have been complaints that prices are in fact too high given that oil prices have fallen 
but prices at the pumps haven’t changed (Pyae Thet Phyo 2016), with some pointing out that 
station owners are profiting from the widened margin between global wholesale prices and local 
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retail prices (Chan Mya Htwe 2016). Despite the political challenges, introducing a marginal tax 
on some types of fuel within the Yangon Region may be a useful strategy for incentivising the use 
of public transport while raising revenue for transport-related investment and maintenance. 
 
An alternative (or complement) to petrol taxes could be modernise parking policies to increase 
the price of parking, restrict the number of available spaces and ensure new parking facilities are 
focused around transport hubs outside of the city centre to encourage public transport use (UN-
Habitat 2013; Yangon Heritage Trust 2016). Current policy is almost a mirror opposite of this 
approach. Parking charges in downtown were eliminated in 2013, thereby reducing costs for 
drivers (Noe Noe Aung 2013), although there is some indication that fees will be collected in a 
planned new multi-storey facility downtown (Aye Nyein Win 2018). The requirement that 
importers prove access to a parking space has only had the effect of stimulating a market for the 
official letters from township officials required as proof (Aye Nyein Win 2015c). And the 
requirement that developers offer 1.2 parking spaces per new condominium unit has had the 
perverse effect of encouraging developers to build fewer small units that would have wide market 
appeal and instead focus on building larger, less affordable units (Chau 2017; Kang Wan Chern 
2018). This, in turn, will result in lower habitation densities in the urban core, which will increase 
demand for journeys from those forced to live further from the centre. In short, the current policy 
mix reflects mid-20th century planning practices that minimise the costs and maximise the 
availability of urban parking, rather than the 21st century planning consensus that making 
parking scarce and expensive is a useful way to optimise the use of urban space, raise revenue 
and encourage use of public transport options (UN-Habitat 2013; Yangon Heritage Trust 2016).    
 
In some ways, this approach to parking is a form of indirect congestion charging, which is an 
increasingly popular idea among planners. This could provide a complementary policy in Yangon. 
There are numerous examples from around the world that confirm the efficacy of this approach 
including Stockholm (Eliasson et al. 2006;); London (Prud'homme et al. 2005); and Singapore 
(Goh 2002). Moreover, Yangon is already in the process of introducing a camera mesh in the city 
centre that could potentially be used to implement such a plan (Shine Lin Aung 2017). However, 
this is also a politically challenging policy strategy and one that requires a high level of 
institutional capacity to implement and manage successfully. Given the tenuous state of urban 
governance arrangements in the city this may not be a viable option in the short to medium run. 
 
4.5 Governance reform 
Current efforts to reform the bus system, introduce a CCTV equipped traffic control system and 
improve traffic enforcement are all positive developments, and it is sensible to consider longer-
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term plans for large-scale infrastructure development, such as a proposed metro system. 
However, such projects and initiatives will not yield sustainable improvements without 
governance reform. 
 
As an emerging megacity Yangon desperately needs an independent transport agency with a 
mandate to maximise urban mobility and accessibility. Such an authority would need to have 
oversight of all modes of transport in the city and coordinate with other authorities involved in 
land use planning. This is complicated by the current fragmented nature of governance in Yangon. 
Creating a transport agency therefore may require deeper institutional reforms to establish a 
coherent foundation for integrated transport planning and delivery.  
 
Sustainable development and maintenance of Yangon’s transport system will require the 
clarification and rationalisation of roles between different tiers and agencies currently involved 
in transport delivery, the creation of a dedicated authority to manage urban transport, and a 
reconsideration of the appropriate boundaries of this authority with reference to the functional 
area of Greater Yangon. This should be considered an urgent priority. Establishing the 
appropriate institutional architecture now could help Yangon avoid the fate of cities such as 
Jakarta, which are today suffering the consequences of coordination failures stemming from 
decades of fragmented urban governance arrangements.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Yangon is thriving, but it is facing a mobility crisis fuelled by rapid economic liberalisation in a 
city that suffers from a legacy of underinvestment and fragmented governance arrangements. 
This crisis has recently stimulated reforms in the bus system, efforts at Region Government level 
to accelerate the delivery of new services (e.g. water taxis) and improve regulation and 
enforcement on city streets. While these are welcome initiatives for city residents, they will not 
provide much relief in the longer run.  
 
As an emerging megacity Yangon will always have traffic. While efforts should be made to reduce 
the social and economic costs of road congestion, eliminating it entirely is simply unrealistic. The 
overarching goal of planners and policy makers should therefore be to maximise mobility and 
accessibility through a holistic approach to urban transportation delivery. Reducing road 
congestion should be a secondary objective and collateral benefit of improving mobility. Focusing 
on improving the experience of drivers by building more roads and parking facilities will not 
ultimately yield the most efficient and equitable outcome.  
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In the short run improvements to urban mobility could be achieved with relatively modest 
expenditure by consolidating ongoing reforms to the bus system, strengthening traffic 
enforcement to reduce flow disruptions, relaxing restrictions on the use of bicycles in central 
Yangon, and investing in cycle and pedestrian infrastructure. In the medium term, developing a 
proper BRT system—with dedicated lanes on key arteries—could be the most cost-effective 
option for creating an attractive mass transit alternative to private transport. A BRT system 
would likely benefit from a parallel strategy of dis-incentivising car use through some 
combination parking restrictions, implementing a tax on petrol consumption in Yangon Region, 
or congestion charging.  
 
To preserve its rich urban heritage, Yangon will need to embrace 21st century integrated 
planning practices that seek to maximise accessibility and mobility for all people rather than 
minimise traffic congestion for those who use cars. This will ultimately require addressing 
deficiencies in the institutional foundations for sustainable urban transport delivery through a 
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Summary of geospatial analysis methods 
 
Analysis of population variation between 2010-2015 
WorldPop datasets for 2010 and 2015 were used for the analysis of population variation in the 
Greater Yangon region, both at township and ward level. The raw 2010 and 2015 raster 
WorldPop data were initially analysed by means of the zonal statistics algorithm using a reference 
grid covering the full extent of the Greater Yangon region with cells of the same spatial resolution 
as that of the WorldPop rasters (i.e. hectare). The zonal statistics algorithm calculates the sum of 
pixels value (population) for each of the cells in the grid, thus allowing us to define population 
densities and population counts for urban settlements. 
 
For the mapping of the population growth rates at township and ward level, the zonal statistics 
algorithm was reapplied to the raw raster scenes using the administrative boundaries of each of 
the townships and wards of the Greater Yangon region as the spatial units of reference. For the 
townships, the estimated population counts have been checked against the available census data.   
 
Analysis of urban expansion 
To evaluate expansion of built-up areas in Greater Yangon over a period of 15+years, a 3 scene 
mosaic Landsat time-series was acquired and pre-processed to a resolution of 15 meters for the 
years 2003, 2013, and 2016. Urban areas were then manually digitized and validated by means 
of visual interpretation.  
 
To establish the ideal years and intervals of acquisition for the scenes the following factors were 
taken into account:   
 
- For the first scene, conditions of cloud cover, luminosity, and the necessity to work with 
Landsat 7 ETM+ (which has the same resolution of Landsat 8 OLI), determined the choice 
of 2003 as the baseline year;  
- The second scene was acquired 10 years from the first to allow for a reasonable timeframe 
for the analysis of urban expansion; 
- The 2016 scene was chosen to provide the most recent possible “snapshot” of the state of 
urban expansion.  
The three urban masks resulting from the process of manual digitization were used to assess the 






Estimating GDP growth in Yangon with nightlights data 
 
In the absence of reliable, sub-national time-series statistics on economic activity in 
Greater Yangon we developed estimates of growth in output in the region by combining 
data from a series of satellite images of nightlights in Myanmar between 1992 and 2013 
with national GDP estimates covering the same period. The use of nightlights data to 
estimate GDP in data-scare contexts is now well-established but controversial.  
The rationale behind this approach is simple: economic activity requires energy, which 
can be remotely observed by sensors on satellites as light emitted by objects on the 
earth’s surface at night (e.g. from lights in factories, homes and transport infrastructure). 
Assuming that light emitted from a region at night and economic output are correlated, 
changes in the amount of light observed in a region should reflect changes in GDP (Elvidge 
et al 2007).  
 
Several studies have indeed confirmed such a correlation utilising national level 
luminosity and GDP data for a large cross-section of countries (Chen and Nordhaus 2011; 
Henderson, Storeygard and Weil 2012; Nordhaus and Chen 2015). This approach has also 
been used to measure spatial variation in levels of economic development across regions 
within individual countries (cf. Gennaioli et al 2013; Michalopoulos & Papaioannou 2013; 
Alesina, Michalopoulos & Papaioannou 2015). However, there are some important 
technical limitations when applying this approach at the sub-national level.  
 
The most widely used nightlights data come from the US Defense Meteorological Satellite 
Program (DMSP).  DMSP satellites are fitted with luminosity sensors that have a bounded 
range of measurement, from 0-63. This restricts the amount of variation in luminosity 
that can be observed and is particularly problematic a) in areas of high economic density, 
such as wealthy metropolitan areas, which can emit enough light to saturate the sensor 
(thereby creating an upper limit on the level of economic activity that can be inferred), 
and b) in low density areas that may emit such low levels of light that they are not 
captured by the sensor and mistakenly recorded as having no human-generated 
luminosity (Bickenbach et al 2016). This technical problem is likely to be attenuated in 
future research by the launch of new satellites with sensors that can accurately measure 
a wider range of frequencies, such as the Suomi National Polar-orbiting Partnership 
weather satellite equipped with the Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS). 
However, our analysis relies on the availability of publicly available time-series data, 
which only the DMSP provides at this point in time. 
 
Other limitations relate to uncertainty with regard to measurement error in both the 
luminosity data and GDP data. This can obscure the ‘true’ relationship between 
luminosity and real GDP and undermine the statistical robustness of the method (see 
Norhaus and Chen 2015). It is also important to note that a relation of exact direct 
proportionality between GDP and observed luminosity cannot be established in 
mathematical terms. Different economic activities will emit different amounts of light, 
while similar activities utilising different technologies may emit exhibit different light 
intensities.  As a result the elasticity of luminosity with respect to GDP may not be 
universal but rather country-specific, region-specific and variable over time. 
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Nevertheless, the accumulated research supports the premise that luminosity and GDP 
co-vary and that using changes in luminosity as a proxy for changes in GDP can be 
valuable in contexts where reliable sub-national economic data are missing.  Moreover, 
for the purposes of obtaining a rough measure of change in output in metropolitan areas 
in low- and middle-income countries, concerns about the bounded nature of luminosity 
measurements are minimised. Metropolitan areas are less susceptible to lower-bound 
errors in measurement than rural areas due to the relatively high density of people and 
hence economic activity; and low- and middle-income countries are less likely to have 
large numbers of saturated pixels (even in urban areas) than high income countries. 
 
Estimating GDP for Greater Yangon 
In order to estimate changes in GDP in greater Yangon we acquired annual DMSP images 
of nightlights in Myanmar covering the years 1992-2013 and national GDP data from the 
Penn World Tables version 9 (PWT)(see Feentra et al 2015). As we are interested in the 
correlation between luminosity and output we use PWT estimates of output-side real 
GDP at chained PPPs in millions of 2011 US dollars. We then calculated the elasticity of 
luminosity with respect to GDP at the national level using the time-series data and then 
applied this equation to the luminosity data from Greater Yangon to derive our sub-
national output estimates.  
 
This approach builds on the findings of previous studies but it is tailored and scaled to a 
sub-national scale of analysis. For instance, in order to prove the correlation of luminosity 
data with national GDP values, Henderson et al. (2012) assumed that the same value of 
elasticity can be applied universally (i.e. the same everywhere and over time). 
Statistically this approach – which is based on the calculation of a normalised value of 
elasticity - is valid to establish a means of comparison across case studies. Our approach 
does not compare several case studies, but it does assume that elasticity is consistent 
within Myanmar, so as to establish a baseline of comparison between luminosity at 
national level and luminosity observed at sub-national level. The approach is 
strengthened by the use luminosity data across the longest possible time series (i.e.,1992-
2013).  
 
The nightlights datasets (stable lights series), which are available for the whole of the 
Earth’s surface, were resized to the national boundaries of Myanmar and to the 
administrative boundaries of the Greater Yangon region. Using the zonal statistics 
algorithm, the overall luminosity value for the two boundaries was calculated on an 
annual basis. When two images were acquired by two different sensors in the same year, 
the luminosity values of the two images were used to produce a mean value image to 
analyse with the zonal statistic algorithm. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the trends in national luminosity, greater Yangon luminosity and real 
GDP between 1992 and 2013. The data were converted to index numbers to facilitate 
visual comparison of rates of change with 2003 set as the base year.  
 
Overall, these three series exhibit similar trends. There are, however, two obvious outlier 
years: 2009 and 2010. It is likely that the dip in luminosity in 2009 reflects extensive 
damage to infrastructure associated with Cyclone Nargis, which hit the country in May 
2008. We cannot confirm the date that the 2008 and 2009 images were taken, but we 
suspect the 2008 image was taken before the cyclone and hence the effect on 
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infrastructure only became apparent in the 2009 image. Conversely, 2010 was an historic 
election year and one which saw a boom in public spending and strong commodity 
exports (IMF 2012).  
 
It is important to note these outliers because variance and co-variance measures - which 
the method is based upon - are sensitive to outliers. The influence of outliers propagates 
to the estimation of the correlation between national luminosity estimates and national 
GDP estimates, and hence to our estimates of the elasticity of luminosity with respect to 
GDP. Figures 2 and 3 show the linear correlation between national luminosity and GDP 
with and without these outlier years respectively. There is a clear linear fit in both cases, 
confirming the robustness of the method increases with the length of data series and the 
richness of the sample, but the fit is considerably stronger when the luminosity 
observations for 2009 and 2010 are excluded—the R-squared increases from .68 to .84. 
By applying these equations to the Greater Yangon luminosity scores we estimated real 
GDP for the city-region. In doing so we assume a) that these equations reflect a true 
underlying correlation between luminosity and GDP in Myanmar, and b) that the 
elasticity of luminosity with respect to GDP is the same at national and sub-national 
scales. These estimates, along with the underlying data, are presented in Table 1. Yangon 
Estimate A employs the equation shown in Figure 2; Yangon Estimate B employs the 
equation shown in Figure 3. 
 
Comparing these figures suggests that the estimates produced from the latter model with 
outliers omitted is preferable. For example, Estimate A suggests that Yangon’s GDP was 
greater than national GDP in 1992 and accounted for over 80 percent of national GDP 
between 1993 and 1997. This is highly unlikely given the size of Myanmar’s population.  
 











National luminosity Yangon luminosity Real GDP
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Table B1 | Myanmar Real GDP, Luminosity and Greater Yangon GDP Estimates, 
1992-2013 
Year 
Real GDP                           











1992 36467 66930 19841 37087 17136 
1993 47334 82332 22610 38294 18774 
1994 45600 85465 24262 39014 19751 
1995 50913 112085 30529 41746 23456 
1996 51099 135018 33671 43115 25314 
1997 50653 114514 28712 40954 22382 
1998 60200 120903 32143 42449 24411 
1999 58412 92162 27941 40617 21926 
2000 57632 149940 36697 44434 27103 
2001 59988 126827 31867 42329 24247 
2002 59475 115118 27743 40531 21809 
2003 68644 88567 22448 38223 18678 
2004 74172 88806 22406 38205 18653 
2005 85341 89106 22401 38202 18650 
2006 96302 95588 22167 38100 18512 
2007 107126 100648 21966 38013 18393 
2008 125765 130582 28573 40893 22300 
2009 137864 73779 17108 35895 15520 
2010 174954 504669 58360 53877 39913 
2011 202453 395084 54265 52092 37491 
2012 240380 336961 54279 52098 37500 




Between 1992 and 2013 the total amount of luminosity observed in Greater Yangon more 
than tripled, from 19841 to 64583. According to our preferred estimates, this suggests 
that GDP in the region increased 2.5 times from roughly 17,000 million US$ to 44,000 
million US$ over the same period. This translates into an average annual growth rate of 
4.45 percent. If we consider the more recent period of reform, beginning in 2008 when 
the constitutional referendum was held, Yangon is estimated to have grown at an average 
annual rate of 11.17 percent.  
 
While these are plausible estimates of growth for the city they must be treated cautiously.  
The World Bank ranks Myanmar’s statistical capacity below the IDA and East Asian 
averages, which highlights the potential for significant measurement error. There are also 
sensor limitations. Strong growth may lead to saturated cells, which can lead to 
underestimation of growth thereafter. Conversely, multi-scatter reflections (i.e. the same 
beam of light splitting by reflection is captured by the sensor in multiple cells) can lead 
to the over estimation of total light. To check this, the earliest and most recent series 
(F18-2013) of the nightlights data was evaluated in discrete classes and plotted in Figures 
4 and 5 below. The results show that very few areas exhibited saturation in 1992, but that 
a large portion of the built-up area of greater Yangon reached the upper bound value of 
63 by the year 2013. This limits our ability to capture further growth in these areas, 
although the method stillremains a potentially valid approach to retrospectively 
estimating growth in the region monitoring the pace of economic change in non-
saturated (e.g. suburban) areas of Greater Yangon in the future.  
 
Overall, our method yields plausible sub-national estimates of growth in Greater Yangon. 
Given that the DMSP data inevitably exhibit some stochastic variation in the 
measurement of luminosity, estimating elasticity (and hence growth) with short time 
series would not be statistically robust. The measurement of luminosity data depend on 
the sensitivity of the sensor to capture light and it is therefore a technical measure. As all 
the technical measurements, it is reasonable to assume that errors in the measurement 
will be systematic. However, random errors can occur both in the measurement (i.e., 
sensor malfunction) as well as in the processing of the satellite value (i.e., data rendering). 
A longer time series reduces the statistical significance of random errors.  
 
Besides technical errors, long time series helps to reveal the presence of outliers—i.e. 
observed luminosity values that are influenced by non-routine events that affect an 
economy, such as natural disasters. It is also important to monitor sensor saturation over 
time in national and sub-national estimates to establish the limits of valid empirical 
inference from this data. Nevertheless, it is a method that may be suitable for monitoring 
economic change in metropolitan areas in low and middle- income countries where 
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